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We consider a two-periodmodel in which a continuum of agents trade in a context of costly information acquisition and systematic
heterogeneous expectations biases. Because of systematic biases agents are supposed not to learn from others’ decisions. In a
previous work under somehow strong technical assumptions a market equilibrium was proved to exist and the supply and demand
functions were proved to be strictly monotonic with respect to the price. Here we extend these results under very weak technical
assumptions. We also prove that the equilibrium price maximizes the trading volume and further additional properties (such as
the antimonotonicity of the trading volume with respect to the marginal information price).
1. Introduction
We consider a continuum of agents that act in a two-period
(� ∈ {0, �}) market consisting of a single asset of value �.
he value� is constant and deterministic but unknown to the
agents. Each agent constructs an estimation for� in the form
of a normal random variable with knownmean and variance.
he numerical value of the mean, which is not necessarily� and as such can be interpreted as a systematic bias, is
given by the estimation method and cannot be changed.
However, the variance can be reduced at time � = 0 by
paying a cost, which is a known deterministic function of
the variance to be attained. Each agent uses a CARA utility
function and constructs the function mapping each triplet
(consisting of the market price, the estimation mean, and
the estimation variance) to the optimal number of units to
trade. he sum of all such functions from all agents results
at time � = 0 in aggregate market demand and supply
functions; the price of the asset is chosen to clear the market
(we prove in particular that such a price exists and is unique).
his price can be diferent from the real value � and in
practice it will. he agents close their position at inal time� = �. his paper investigates the following questions:
existence of an equilibrium, continuity of supply and demand
functions, and interpretation of the equilibrium price as the
value maximizing the liquidity (trading volume).
he paper is organized as follows. he rest of this section
presents a literature overview. In Section 2 the model is
explained and the fundamental Assumption 3 is introduced.
In Sections 3 and 3.1, we prove the existence of an equilibrium
and important properties of the liquidity (here deined as
the transaction volume); in particular we prove that the
equilibrium price maximizes the trading volume. We apply
our results to a Grossmann-Stiglitz framework in Section 4.
Finally, in Section 5 we show that the liquidity is inversely
correlated with the marginal price of information.
1.1. Literature Overview. hemodel has two important ingre-
dients:
(i) the existence of heterogeneous beliefs (or expecta-
tions) biases among a continuum of agents;
(ii) the fact that the information is costly (the literature
refers to “information acquisition” cost).
here are many models that explain how disagreements
between agent estimations generate investment decisions
and trading volume. he importance of the heterogeneity of
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opinions on the future value of a inancial instrument and its
use in speculation has been recognized as early as Keynes (see
[1]) who invokes the “beauty contest” metaphor to explain
how speculators infer the future (consensus) price.
A model of speculative trading in a large economy
with a continuum of agents with heterogeneous beliefs was
presented in [2, 3] (see also the references within). hey
demonstrate the existence of price ampliication efects and
show that the equilibrium prices can be diferent from the
rational expectation equilibrium price. It is also shown that
trading volume is positively related to the directions of price
changes and they explain the recurrent presence of diverse
beliefs. We also refer to [4] and references within for a
survey on how heterogeneous beliefs among agents generate
speculation and trading.
he diference-of-opinion approach (see [5, 6]) does not
consider “noise agents” but on the contrary obtains diverse
posterior beliefs from the diferences in the way agents inter-
pret common information.hey focus on the implications of
the dispersion in beliefs on the price level or direction. Yet
another diferent method explains diverse posterior beliefs
by relaxing the assumption of a common prior distribution
(see [7]); the authors also model the learning process which
enables a convergence towards a common estimation when
more information is available. Such a frameworkwas invoked
for modeling asset pricing during initial public oferings, but
not for other speculative circumstances. Finally, Pagano [8]
analyze the implications of low liquidity in a market and
propose appropriate incentive schemes to shit the market
to an equilibrium characterized by a higher number of
transactions.
An important advance has been to recognize that the
dynamics of the information gathering is important; it was
thus established how the presence of private information
and noise (liquidity) agents interact with market price and
volume (see, e.g., [9–11], for recent related endeavors). More
speciically it was recognized (the so called “Grossman-
Stiglitz paradox”) that it is not always optimal for the agents to
obtain all the information on a particular asset. his remark
is of importance in our paper in the following because, as
explained in Section 2, ourmodel allows each agent to choose
his level of precision related to the estimation of the true
value of the traded asset. In the classical paper of [12] and
in subsequent related works [13–18] a framework is proposed
where the information is costly and agents can pay more
to lower their uncertainty on the future value of the risky
asset. Verrechia derives a closed form solutionwhich requires
some particular assumptions. hese include the convexity of
the cost function with respect to the precision (the precision
being the inverse of the estimate’s variance). On the contrary
our cost function is here only lower semicontinuous. Our
approach also difers in a more fundamental way in that
we suppose that heterogeneity of estimations is given but
arbitrary, that is, not centered around the correct price.
Moreover, theVerrecchiamodel relies on the heterogeneity of
risk tolerances in theCARAutility functionwhile in ourwork
the price formation mechanism does not require such an
assumption, the heterogeneity in estimations being enough.
Also, in this model, the endowments of the agents do not
play any role and in particular are not required to obtain an
equilibrium. he paper extends a previous work [19] where
stronger technical assumptions were invoked.
2. The Model
We consider a two-period model, � = 0 and � = �, in which a
risky security of value� is traded.he value� is unknown to
the agents and each participant � in the market constructs an
estimate �̃� for � at � = 0, �̃� being a random variable. For
simplicity, we suppose that �̃� has a normal distribution and
that �̃�1 and �̃�2 are independent if �1 and �2 are two distinct
agents (this independence assumption is motivated by the
existence of an individual bias for each agent as explained
below). Also, we assume that the mean and the variance of�̃� are, respectively, given by �� and (��)2, both mean and
variance being known to the agent �. As in [12] we work with
the precision �� = 1/(��)2 instead of the variance (��)2.
Many estimation procedures can output results in the
formof a normal variable with knownmean and variance, the
most known example being a Kalman-Bucy ilter; see [20] for
details.
Note that we do not model here the riskless security, but
everythingworks as if the numeraire was the riskless security;
from a technical point of view this allows setting the interest
rate to zero.
An important remark is that each agent has his own bias
attached to the estimate �̃� because he has his own procedure
to interpret the available information. It may be due to
personal optimism or pessimism (e.g., the agent is a “bull”
or “bear”) or may be correlated with some exogenous factors,
such as overall economic outlooks, commodities evolution,
and geopolitical factors, which each agent interprets with
a speciic systematic bias. See also the cited references for
additional discussion on how agents interpret the informa-
tion they obtain. We assume that the bias �� − � of agent �
does not depend on the precision �� to be attained and only
depends on the agent; the value �� associated to an agent is
known only by him. he agent does not inluence �� in any
way during the process of forecasting; his forecasting process
is not inluenced by other agents’ decisions; that is, there is no
collective learning in this model. Hence, two diferent agents�1 and �2 have generically diferent biases��1−� and��2−�
and thus diferent estimation averages ��1 and ��2 . his is
not a collateral property of the model. It is instead the mere
reason for which the agents trade. hey trade because they
have diferent (heterogeneous) expectations on the inal value
of the security.
We deine �(�) to be the distribution of �� among
the agents; neither the law of the distribution �(�) nor
any moments or statistics is known by the agents. We also
introduce the expected value with respect to �(⋅), which is
denoted by E�; see also [21] for related works on empirical
estimation of such a distribution �. We do not assume the
law of � to be normal or have particular properties (except
technical Assumption 9).
Froma theoretical point of view, it is interesting to explore
the case when E�(�) = �. his means that the average
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estimate is �, so that the agents are neither overpricing
nor underpricing the security with respect to its (unknown)
value. However, we will see that this does not necessarily
indicate that the market price is �.
he only parameter the agent can control is the accuracy
of the result, that is, the precision��. However, this has a cost:
the agent has to pay �(��) to obtain the precision ��. he
precision cost function � : R+ → R+ is deined on positive
numbers but if needed we set by convention �(�) = ∞ for
any � < 0. See also [22] for an example involving a power
function and [18] for a structural model to motivate such a
function.
Such a model is relevant in the case of high expense for
information sources, for instance, news broadcasting fees.
he expense also involves the reward of research personnel
or the need for more accurate computer simulations.
Based on his estimations the agent � decides at time � = 0
to trade a quantity of �� security units. When �� is positive,
the agent is long, so he buys the security, whereas when �� is
negative, he is short; he sells it.
Hence, each agent is characterized by three parameters:
his mean estimate ��, the precision �� of the estimate (that
comes at a cost �(��)), and the quantity of traded units, ��.
he agents buy or sell the security at time � = 0 by
formulating demand and supply functions depending on the
price. he market price at time � = 0 is chosen to clear the
aggregate total demand/supply.
Remark 1. he price that clears the market is also called
market equilibrium price. Note however that the uniqueness
of the equilibrium is, at this stage, not proved.
We set the investment horizon of all agents to be the
inal time � = � which is the time when each agent
liquidates his initial position. Each agent supposes that this
inal transaction takes place at a price in agreement with his
initial estimation.
In order to describe the model for the market price, we
introduce for any price � > 0 the basic notions of total supply�(�) and total demand�(�) deined as
�(�) = E� (�+) , � (�) = E� (�−) , (1)
where for any real number � we deine �+ = max{�, 0},�− = max{−�, 0}.
A price �∗ such that �(�∗) = �(�∗) is said to clear the
market. From the deinition of �(⋅) and �(⋅) in (1) this is
equivalent to saying that E�(�) = 0; that is, at the price �∗,
the overall (signed) demand is zero. Note that such a price
may not exist or may not be unique. Hence, one of the goals
of the paper is to prove existence and uniqueness of �∗.
he transaction volume at some price � is the number of
units that can be exchanged at that price and is deined as
follows:
TV (�) = min {� (�) , � (�)} . (2)
A price �∗ for which TV(⋅) reaches its maximum is of
particular interest because it maximizes the total number of
asset units being exchanged. Note that such a price may not
exist and may also be nonunique.
Let us recall the following result (see [19] for the proof).
heorem 2. Suppose that functions �(�),�(�) are continuous
and positive, �(0) = 0, and lim�→∞�(�) = 0. Consider the
following.
(A) If �(�) is increasing, not identically zero, and �(�) is
decreasing, then there exists at least one price �∗ < ∞
such that �(�∗) = �(�∗); moreover TV(�∗) ≥ ��(�)
for all � ≥ 0.
(B) In addition to previous assumptions suppose that �(�)
is strictly increasing and lim�→∞�(�) > 0, whereas�(�) is strictly decreasing and such that �(0) > 0.
hen the following statements are true.
(1) here exists a unique �∗1 such that �(�∗1 ) =�(�∗1 ).
(2) here exists a unique �∗2 such that TV(�∗2 ) ≥
TV(�) for all � ≥ 0.
(3) Moreover �∗1 = �∗2 .
Recall that � : R+ → R+ ∪ {+∞} is said to be lower
semicontinuous (denoted by “l.s.c.”) if for any � ∈ R+
� (�) ≤ lim inf�→� � (�) . (3)
A function � such that −� is l.s.c. is said to be upper
semicontinuous (denoted by “u.s.c.”).
For any function � : R+ → R+ ∪ {+∞} we deine
� (�) = lim inf�→� � (�) , �� (�) = lim inf�→� � (�) − � (�)� − � .
(4)




Let us introduce an important assumption of this paper.
Assumption 3. We say that a function � : R+ → R+ ∪{+∞} satisies Assumption 3 if �(0) < ∞, � is lower
semicontinuous, and there exists � > 0 such that
lim inf�→∞
� (�)
�1+� > 0. (5)
Remark 4. he quantity �(0) < ∞ represents the residual
cost, when precision approaches zero, to enter themarket. It is
not related to the precision (because there is none in the limit)
but to the ixed costs to trade on the market (independent
of the quantity). A market with ininite ixed costs is not
realistic.
he assumption �(0) < ∞ implies, by lower semiconti-
nuity, that �(0) < ∞ and is realistic in that it demands that
the price of zero precision be inite.
In order to model the choices of the agents, we consider
that the agents maximize a CARA-type expected utility
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function (see [23]); that is, if the output is the randomvariable
�, they maximize E(−�−��). Note that if � is a normal
random variable with mean E(�) and variance var(�), then
maximizing E(−�−��) is equivalent to maximizing the mean-
variance utility function E(�) − ((�/2)var(�)). We refer to
(6) for the treatment of degenerate normal variables with
ininite variance. he parameter � ∈ R+ is called the risk
aversion coeicient. Note that all agents have here the same
utility function; see for instance [24, 25] who argue that
diferences in preferences are not a major factor in explaining
the magnitude of trade in speculative markets.
Of course, the expectedwealth of the agent at time � = � is
a function of �� and ��. It is computed under the assumption
that each agent enters the transaction (buys or sells) at time� = 0 at the market price and exits the transaction (sells or
buys) at time � = � at a price coherent with his estimation;
that is, we condition on the available information at time � =0. hus, for a given price �, which is not necessarily equal to
the market equilibrium priceP, the average expected wealth
at time � = � of the agent � denoted by �� is given by �� =��(�� − �) − �(��). he variance of the wealth, denoted by
V
�, is given by V� = (��)2/��.
hus, for a given price � (not necessarily themarket equi-
librium price P) the fact that agent � optimizes his CARA
utility function is equivalent to saying that he optimizes with
respect to �� and �� his mean-variance utility:
�(��, ��)=
{{{{{{{{{
��(��− �)− �(��)− �2
(��)2
�� if ��, �� > 0−∞ if ��=0, ��> 0
−� (0) if �� = �� = 0.
(6)
3. Existence of the Transaction Volume
Each agent � is characterized by his own bias ��. he agents
consider the market price as being ixed, which means they
cannot inluence it directly. hey do not know any statistics
on � so the market price is not directly informative, but the
acquired information is. herefore, their strategy depend on
two values: the bias � and the market price �.
Under Assumption 3, the agent chooses the optimal pair
of precision �opt(�, �; �) and demand/supply �opt(�, �; �),
that is, the value of the pair maximizing the following
expression:
J (�, �) =
{{{{{{{
� (� − �) − � (�) − �2
�2
� if �, � > 0−∞ if � = 0, � > 0
−� (0) if � = � = 0,
(7)
so that
J (�opt (�, �; �) , �opt (�, �; �)) ≥ J (�, �) , ∀�, � ≥ 0.
(8)
Let ��,�;�(�) = ((� − �)2/2�)� − �(�) and let �
be the function deined by �(�, �) = (� − �)2/2�. To
simplify the notations we sometimes write only ��,�, ��,
or � instead of ��,�;� and �opt(�, �)/�opt(�, �) instead of�opt(�, �; �)/�opt(�, �; �); likewise � stands for �(�, �).
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 3, for any � and �, there exists
a pair (�opt(�, �), �opt(�, �)) such that (8) is satisied.
Proof. Since � satisies Assumption 3, there exists �1 > 0 and
some positive constant �1 such that �(�) ≥ �1�1+� for all� ≥ �1. In particular for
� > max{�1, (2��1)
1/�, (2� (0)�1 )
1/(1+�)} , (9)
we have �(�) < −�(0) = �(0). Since � is l.s.c. then � is u.s.c.;
it follows that � attains its maximum on R+ in the interval[0,max{�1, (2�/�1)1/�, (2�(0)/�1)1/(1+�)}]. We set �opt(�, �)
to be one such maximum (it may not be unique) and set�opt(�, �) = (� − �)�opt(�, �)/�.
Note that �opt(�, �) = 0 implies �opt(�, �) = 0; thus
∀� > 0 : J (�opt (�, �) , �opt (�, �)) > −∞ = J (�, 0) .
(10)
When � = � = 0, one has
J (0, 0) = � (0) ≤ � (�opt (�, �))
= J (�opt (�, �) , �opt (�, �)) .
(11)
Let �, � > 0. Since J is a parabola with negative leading
coeicient with respect to its irst argument, it follows that
J (�, �) ≤ J((� − �) �� , �) = � (�) ≤ � (�opt (�, �))
= J (�opt (�, �) , �opt (�, �)) .
(12)
Remark 6. Note that the formula �opt(�, �) = (� −�)�opt(�, �)/� is completely compatible with previousworks,
see [26] p575, although here we have no assumption on
budget constraints and the risk-less interest rate is set to zero.
In order to prove the existence of an equilibrium we need
the following auxiliary results (Lemmas 7–11).
Lemma 7. Under Assumption 3, let (�1, �1), (�2, �2) be such
that �1 ≤ �2, where �� = �(��, ��). hen �opt(�1, �1) ≤�opt(�2, �2). One says that �opt(�, �) is increasing with respect
to �. In particular, for ixed �, one has the following:
(i) �opt(�, �) is increasing with respect to � on the interval]�,∞[;
(ii) �opt(�, �) is decreasing with respect to � on the interval]0, �[.
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Proof. Let �� = �opt(��, ��), for � = 1, 2. Recall that ��
optimizes ��� − �(�) with respect to �. hen
�1�1 − � (�1) ≥ �1�2 − � (�2)
= �2�2 − � (�2) + (�1 − �2) �2
≥ �2�1 − � (�1) + (�1 − �2) �2.
(13)
hus,�1�1 ≥ �2�1+(�1−�2)�2 and hence (�1−�2)(�1−�2) ≥0, which gives the conclusion.
Lemma 8. Under Assumption 3, let �� = �(��, ��), � ≥ 0, be
a sequence such that ��→ �→+∞�0 but �opt(��, ��) does not
converge to�opt(�0, �0).he set of such�0 is atmost countable.
In particular, if � is ixed, then the set of� such that �opt(�, �)
is discontinuous with respect to � is countable. An analogous
result holds if � is ixed.
Proof. Let �� = �opt(��, ��), for � ≥ 0. Without loss of
generality, we only investigate the case when the sequence ��
converges decreasingly to �0. hen, we have �� ≥ �0, ∀� ≥ 0.
Since �� does not converge to �0, let � = (lim�→+∞��) −�0. Note that � > 0 and �� ≥ �0 + �, ∀� ≥ 0. Also recall that
���� − � (��) ≥ ��� − � (�) , ∀�. (14)
Yet, since −� is u.s.c.,
�0 (�0 + �) − � (�0 + �) ≥ lim sup�→∞ (���� − � (��)) , (15)
and for ixed �, ��� − �(�) converges to �0� − �(�). In the
limit when � → ∞, it holds that
�0 (�0 + �) − � (�0 + �) ≥ �0� − � (�) , ∀�. (16)
his implies that �0 + � is also a maximum for �0� −�(�). From this we deduce that ��0 has at least two distinct
maximums, �0 and �0 + �.
Let � be such that �� has at least two distinct minimums�1� and �2� with �1� < �2�; we associate to � a rational number�� such that �� ∈ ]�1�, �2�[. Take � and �̃ such that � ̸= �̃; to
ix notations suppose � < �̃. hen by the previous result�2� ≤ �1�̃; moreover �� < �2� ≤ �1�̃ < ��̃; that is, �� ̸= ��̃. hus
the set of � such that �� has at least two distinct minimums
is of cardinality smaller than the cardinality of Q, that is, at
most countable. Since continuity can only fail when �� has
nonunique maximum, the conclusion follows.
Assumption 9. We say that �(�) satisies Assumption 9 if � is




�1+2/�� (�) �� < ∞. (17)
Lemma 10. Let �(�, �) and�(�, �) (or in short notation �(�)
and �(�) when function � is implicit) be deined by
� (�, �) = 12� ∫
∞
0
(� − �)−�opt (�, �; �) � (�) ��,
� (�, �) = 12� ∫
∞
0
(� − �)+�opt (�, �; �) � (�) ��.
(18)
henunderAssumptions 3 and 9 �(�) and�(�) are inite, con-
tinuous, and monotonic. Moreover �(0) = 0 = lim�→∞�(�).
Proof. To prove that �(�) and �(�) are inite we recall
that the maximum of ��,� is attained in the interval[0,max{�1,(2�/�1)1/�, (2�(0)/�1)1/(1+�)}]; that is, �opt(�, �)
≤ max{�1, (2�/�1)1/�, (2�(0)/�1)1/(1+�)}. Recalling that � =
(� − �)2/2� it follows that both integrals are bounded (mod-
ulo some constant) by ∫∞0 �1+2/��(�)��; that is, �(�) and�(�) are inite for all � ≥ 0.
Let�� be a sequence increasingly converging to�. For any�, the set of� such that�opt(�, �) is discontinuous is at most
countable. Denote it byB�. LetB = B� ∪ (⋃+∞�=1 B��).B is
also clearly countable and thus �(B) = 0.
Let ��(�) = (�−��)−�opt(��, �) and �(�) =(�−�)−�opt(�, �). hen lim�→+∞��(�) = �(�), for all� with the possible exception of the null set B. Also, the
sequence �� is increasing.
hen from the Beppo-Levi theorem, the following holds:
lim
�→+∞
� (��)= lim�→+∞ 12� ∫
+∞
0




(� − �)−�opt (�, �) � (�) �� = � (�) .
(19)
his proves sequential continuity of �(�) and thus its conti-
nuity.hemonotonicity is a consequence of themonotonicity
of �opt(�, �). his result also holds for the demand �(�),
recalling that −�(�) is increasing and lower-bounded.
he property �(0) = 0 is trivial. To prove lim�→∞�(�) =0 it is suicient to use the above upper bound for �opt(�, �)
and lim�→∞ ∫∞� �1+2/��(�)�� = 0.
Recall that �(�) is increasing on [0, +∞[ but in order to
use heorem 2 we need to prove its strict monotonicity.
Lemma 11. Under Assumptions 3 and 9 and supposing(��(0))
+
< ∞ the following hold:
(1) �(�) is strictly increasing on ]√2�(��(0))+ +
inf(supp(�)), +∞[;
(2) �(0) = 0;
(3) lim�→+∞�(�) > 0;
(4) �(�) is strictly decreasing on [0, sup(supp(�)) −
√2�(��(0))+];
(5) if sup(supp(�)) > √2�(��(0))+, then�(0) > 0;
(6) lim�→+∞�(�) = 0.
Remark 12. he assumption (��(0))
+
< ∞ will be relaxed in
Section 3.1, cf. heorem 18.
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Proof. Note that (��(0))
+
< ∞ implies in particular con-
tinuity of �(�) at � = 0. Letting � and �� be such that� > �� > � ≥ 0,
� (�) − � (��) = 12� ∫
∞
0
[(� − �)−�opt (�, �)




[(� − �)−�opt (�, �)




[(� − ��)−�opt (�, �)
− (� − ��)−�opt (��, �)] � (�) ��.
(20)





(� − ��)− (�opt (�, �) − �opt (��, �)) � (�) �� ≥ 0.
(21)
Hence,




((� − �)− − (� − ��)−) �opt (�, �) � (�) ��.
(22)
Note that� < �� < � implies that ((� − �)−−(� − ��)−) > 0.
So, in order to prove the strict inequality in the estimation
above, it is suicient to prove that �opt(�, �) > 0 with � in
the support of �. Yet
�opt (�, �) = argmax� �� (�) = argmax� (�� − � (�)) . (23)
herefore we only need to prove that there exists � such that�� − �(�) > 0 with � in the support of �. A suicient
condition is that the upper limit of derivative of �� − �(�) at� = 0 be strictly positive. his means � − (��(0))
+
> 0 which
is equivalent to (� − �)2/2� > (��(0))
+
. Recalling that� > �,
the latter condition can be rewritten as � − � > √2�(��(0))+
or else � > � + √2�(��(0))+, for at least one � in the
support of �. herefore �(�) − �(��) > 0 as soon as � is in
]√2�(��(0))+ + inf(supp(�)), +∞[. his implies strict mono-
tonicity for �(�) on ]√2�(��(0))+ + inf(supp(�)), +∞[ and
hence also on the interval [√2�(��(0))++ inf(supp(�)), +∞[.
We have already seen that �(0) = 0. Moreover
since the supply is strictly increasing on [√2�(��(0))+ +
inf(supp(�)), +∞[ and increasing on [0, +∞[, it holds that
lim�→+∞�(�) > 0.
For the monotonicity of the demand, let � and �� be such
that � > � > ��. hen
�(�) − � (��) = 12� ∫
∞
0
[(� − �)+�opt (�, �)




[(� − �)+�opt (�, �)




[(� − ��)+�opt (�, �)
−(� − ��)+�opt (��, �)]� (�) ��.
(24)





(� − ��)+ (�opt (�, �) − �opt (��, �)) � (�) �� ≤ 0.
(25)
Hence,
�(�) − � (��) ≤ 12� ∫
∞
0
((� − �)+ − (� − ��)+)
× �opt (�, �) � (�) ��.
(26)
Note that � > � > �� implies that (� − �)+ − (� − ��)+ < 0.
For strict inequality it is suicient to prove that �opt(�, �) >0. Using the same arguments as in Lemma 11, we have strict
monotonicity as soon as (� − �)2/2� > (��(0))
+
.
Recalling that� < �, the latter condition can bewritten as
�−� > √2�(��(0))+ or else � < �−√2�(��(0))+ for at least
one� in the support of �.herefore,�(�)−�(��) < 0 as soon
as � is in ]0, sup(supp(�)) − √2�(��(0))+[. his yields strict
monotonicity of �(�) on ]0, sup(supp(�)) − √2�(��(0))+[.
Monotonicity also holds on [0, sup(supp(�)) − √2�(��(0))+]
by continuity.
Since sup(supp(�)) − √2�(��(0))+ > 0, we have�opt(0, �) > 0 so�(0) > 0.
Hence, demand is strictly decreasing. Previously we also
proved that lim�→+∞�(�) = 0.
he above results can be summarized in the following.
heorem 13. Under Assumptions 3 and 9 and supposing(��(0))
+
< ∞ the following hold:
(A) there exists at least a �∗ ≥ 0 such that ��(�∗) ≥��(�), ∀� ≥ 0; moreover�(�∗) = �(�∗);
(B) suppose that diam(supp(�)) > 2√2�(��(0))+; then
(1) the functions �opt and �opt are well deined,












Figure 1: Illustration of Remark 14.
(2) there exists a unique �∗ > 0 such that ��(�∗) ≥��(�), ∀� ≥ 0. Moreover �∗ is the unique
solution of the equation�(�∗) = �(�∗).
Note that the results of [19] are a special case of thisheorem
(any convex �2 function is l.s.c.).
Remark 14. If diam(supp(�)) ≤ 2√2�(��(0))+, then TV ≡ 0
and �(�) = �(�) = 0, ∀� (see Figure 1).
Remark 15. Since we assume the distribution � to be abso-
lutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it
holds that diam(supp(�)) > 0. hus one can always ind a













such that for any � < �∗, the assumptions of heorem 13 are
satisied; that is, there exists a market price maximizing the
volume and clearing the market. On the contrary there exists
no such market price for � ≥ �∗. he results of [19] are a
special case of this remark. In fact, under the assumptions
given in [19], (��(0))
+
= ��(0) = 0 and thus �∗ = 0.
he critical value �∗ can be interpreted as the maximum
risk aversion allowing the market to function. If the risk
aversion becomes larger than the critical value, the market
stops and a liquidity crisis occurs. In the latter case, several
actions can be proposed to stop the liquidity crisis:
(i) lowering the perception of risk, that is, lower the � of
the agents;
(ii) making �∗ higher by lowering (��(0))
+
, that is,
lower the marginal cost of information around zero
precision. In other words, eliminate any entry barriers
for new agents on that market by largely spreading
information about the real situation of the asset �;
(iii) making �∗ higher by increasing diam(supp(�)). his
means inviting to the market agents with new, dif-
ferent evaluation procedures. his can be carried
out for instance by eliminating any entry barrier for
newcomers when they have a diferent background
and diferent evaluation procedures.
3.1. Necessary and Suicient Results for General Functions. In
this section we relax the assumption (��(0))
+
< ∞. For any
function ℎ we denote by ℎ∗ the Legendre-Fenchel transform
(cf. [27]) of ℎ and by ℎ∗∗ the Legendre-Fenchel transform
applied twice, and so on. We show in this section that the
twice Legendre-Fenchel transform �∗∗ of the cost function� has remarkable properties; that is, we can replace � by �∗∗
for any practical means. In particular this means that from a
technical point of view one can suppose that� is convex even
if the actual function is not.
heorem 16. Let � be a function satisfying Assumption 3.he
following properties hold for �∗∗:
(1) �∗∗ also satisies Assumption 3;
(2) except for a countable set of values �(�, �), one has
�opt (�, �; �) = �opt (�, �; �∗∗) ,
�opt (�, �; �) = �opt (�, �; �∗∗) ; (28)
(3) as a consequence
� (�, �) = � (�∗∗, �) , � (�, �) = � (�∗∗, �) , ∀� ≥ 0.
(29)
Proof. To prove point (1) we recall that �∗∗ is a convex
function and ∀� ≥ 0, �∗∗(�) ≤ �(�). In particular �∗∗ is l.s.c.
and continuous in 0. Let us now check the growth condition
and take � that satisies Assumption 3 for �. Take also �1 as
the constant in Lemma 5; that is,�(�) ≥ �1�1+� for all� ≥ �1.
Consider now the function
�1 (�) = {0 if � ≤ �1�1�1+� if � > �1. (30)
hen it is straightforward to see that
�∗∗1 (�) =
{{{{{{{
0 if � ≤ �1�1 (1 + �) ��2 (� − �1) if �1 ≤ � ≤ �2
�1�1+� if � ≥ �2,
(31)
where �2 = ((1 + �)/�)�1; of course �1 ≤ � and is
l.s.c. hen we also have the inequality �∗∗1 ≤ �∗∗. But
obviously lim inf�→∞�∗∗1 (�)/�1+� = �1 > 0. Hence
lim inf�→∞�∗∗(�)/�1+� > 0.
To prove point (2) we recall that the cost function � is
used only as a part of the function ��. Let us take a point �0
and �0 a minimum of ��0 . his implies
�0�0 − � (�0) ≥ �0� − � (�) ∀� (32)
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which can also be written as
� (�) ≥ � (�0) + �0 (� − �0) . (33)
hat is, as stated in [27], the function � has a supporting
hyperplane at �0. Since � has a supporting hyperplane at�0 this implies that �(�0) = �∗∗(�0); recall that �∗∗ is the
convex hull of �, that is, the largest convex function such that�∗∗ ≤ �. Hence, recall that for any function �∗∗∗ = �∗,
�0�0 − �∗∗ (�0) = �0�0 − � (�0) = �∗ (�0)
= �∗∗∗ (�0) = max� �0� − �∗∗ (�) .
(34)
We thus obtained that �0 is a maximum of �0� − �∗∗(�).
herefore, if � is replaced by �∗∗, the minimization
problem involving �� gives the same solution, except possibly
a countable set of values � where the maximum is attained
(either for � or �∗∗) in more than one point.
Point (3) is a mere consequence of point (2).
For all purposes of calculating aggregate supply and
demand we can thus replace � by �∗∗, that is, replace � by
its convex hull. herefore, one can work as if � was convex.
Remark 17. his result is particularly useful when�(0) ̸= �(0)
because in this situation (��(0))
+
= ∞. hen one cannot
use the previous results that guarantee the uniqueness of the
market clearing price. When � is replaced by �∗∗ it can be
shown that (��(0) )
+
becomes inite and the results apply for
�∗∗. However heorem 16 allows recovering the results for
the initial function � and obtaining the full information on
the supply and demand functions and on the market price.
We obtain the following.
heorem 18. Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 9 are satisied.
hen there exists at least one priceP ≥ 0 such that
��(P) ≥ �� (�) , ∀� ≥ 0. (35)
his price also satisies
�(P) = � (P) . (36)
Furthermore, consider the following.
(I) If there exists � > 0 such that �(�) < �(0),
then �(�; �) and �(�; �) are always strictly positive
and strictly monotonic, �(0) = 0 = lim�→∞�(�).
Moreover the priceP satisfying (35) is unique.
(II) Suppose now that �(�) ≥ �(0), ∀� ≥ 0; then the
following hold:
(a) (alternative 1) suppose that diam(supp(�)) >
2√2�((�∗∗)�(0))+; then
(i) the functions �opt and �opt are well deined,
(ii) the price P satisfying (35) is unique and
��(P) > 0; P is also the unique solution
of (36);
(b) (alternative 2) if on the contrary one supposes that
diam (supp (�)) ≤ 2√2�((�∗∗)� (0))
+
, (37)
then ��(�) = 0, ∀� ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove irst point (I). If �(�∗) < �(0), then for all� ≥ 0, ��∗ − �(�∗) > � ⋅ 0 − �(0); thus �opt(�, �) > 0 for
all �, �. As a consequence we obtain �(�; �) > 0 for all �
and the same for �(�; �). For strict monotonicity it suices to
use same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 11. Of course,�(0) = 0 = lim�→∞�(�) due to Lemma 10.
he point (IIa) follows from the discussion above.
To prove (IIb) we need to analyze in greater detail the
values of �(�) and �(�). If we consider �opt(�, �; �∗∗) > 0,
then ��opt(�, �; �∗∗) − �∗∗(�opt(�, �; �∗∗)) > � ⋅ 0 − �∗∗(0)
(we exclude the null measure set of � where more than one
maximum can exists; that is, we can suppose the inequality
to be strict); hence
�∗∗ (�opt (�, �; �∗∗)) < �∗∗ (0) + ��opt (�, �; �∗∗) , (38)
or, for some �1 < �,
�∗∗ (�opt (�, �; �∗∗)) ≤ �∗∗ (0) + �1�opt (�, �; �∗∗) . (39)
Since �∗∗ is convex we have for arbitrary � ∈[0, �opt(�, �; �∗∗)], �∗∗(�) ≤ �∗∗(0) + �1�. But this means
((�∗∗)�(0))
+
≤ �1 < �; that is, |� − �| > √2�((�∗∗)�(0))+.
If�(�) is always zero, the conclusion is reached. Suppose
now � exists such that �(�) > 0; then at least some � in
the support of � exists such that �opt(�, �; �∗∗) > 0 and(� − �)+ > 0; the three conditions imply
sup (supp (�)) − √2�((�∗∗)�(0))
+
> 0. (40)
Moreover, we have �(�) = 0 for � ≥ sup(supp(�)) −
√2�((�∗∗)�(0))+.
From (40) and (37), we conclude that




+ inf (supp (�)) .
(41)
A similar reasoning as the above shows that �(�) = 0 for � ≤
√2�((�∗∗)�(0))+ + inf(supp(�)). herefore for any � either�(�) = 0 or �(�) = 0 and the conclusion follows.
In general, the priceP has an implicit dependence on the
cost function �(⋅) with no particular properties. But when
the distribution � is completely symmetric around some
particular value �1; we obtain the following result.
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heorem 19. Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 9 are satisied
and there exists �1 > 0 such that
∀� ∈ R : � (�1 − �) = � (�1 + �) , (42)
(with the convention that � is null onR−); then one can take in
heorem 18 P = �1.
Proof. he proof follows from the remark that, except pos-
sibly for a null measure set of values �(�, �), the function�opt(�, �; �) is symmetric around �; that is, �opt(�, �; �) =�opt(�, 2� − �; �); thus �opt(�, �; �) is antisymmetric. Since
the distribution � is symmetric then�(�1) = �(�1).
4. An Application: The
Grossman-Stiglitz Framework
We follow [9] to analyze a classical situation where costly
information can be used to lower the uncertainty of the esti-
mation. Note however that in the cited work the equilibrium
is reached without modeling the variations in supply and in
the absence of the distribution �(�).
In the Grossman-Stiglitz model agents can either pay
nothing and have a precision �1 or pay a ixed cost �� to gain
precision up to level �2 > �1. his leads to the function
� (�) = {{{{{
0 if � ≤ �1�� if �1 < � ≤ �2+∞ if � > �2.
(43)
he function � does not satisfy assumption in [19] and as
such the result therein cannot be used. It however satisies
the Assumption 3; thus using the heorem 18 we can replace� with the following convex function �GS = �∗∗ deined as
�GS (�) =
{{{{{{{
0 if � ≤ �1
�� � − �1�2 − �1 if �1 ≤ � ≤ �2+∞ if � > �2.
(44)
Note that �GS fulills Assumption 3 with an arbitrary � ≥ 0.
Suppose that the distribution �(�) fulills the requirements in
Assumption 9; absolute continuity with respect to Lebesgue
measure and a moment of order 1 + � (with arbitrary small �)
has to exist. hen a (equilibrium) market price exists and is
unique. Note that ��GS(0) = 0; thus �∗GS = 0.
he unsigned demand is
�opt (�, �) =
{{{{{{{{{
(� − �) �1� if ����� − ����� <
2���(�2 − �1)(� − �) �2� if ����� − ����� ≥
2���(�2 − �1) .
(45)
he optimal precision is either �1 (irst case of (45)) or �2
(second case).
5. Transaction Volume and Marginal Costs
Wedescribe in the following the relationship between the cost
function � and the trading volume.
heorem 20. Suppose that �1 and �2 both satisfy
Assumption 3 and that � satisies Assumption 9.
(A) Assume that
�2 (�) − �2 (�)� − � ≥
�1 (�) − �1 (�)� − � , ∀�, � ≥ 0, � ̸= �.
(46)
hen ���1 ≥ ���2 .
(B) In particular if �1 and �2 are such that
��1 (�+) ≤ ��2 (�+) , ��1 (�−) ≤ ��2 (�−) , ∀� ≥ 0, (47)
(all are lateral derivatives) then ���1 ≥ ���2 .
Remark 21. Note that if �1 and �2 are convex, both lateral
derivatives are deined at each point and (A) implies (B); thus
for practical purposes (cf. also Section 3.1) the point (B) is not
weaker than point (A).
Remark 22. If��1(�) and��2(�) exist at a certain point�, then
(47) implies that ��1(�) ≤ ��2(�). hus, the above result is a
generalization of the analogous theorem in [19].
Proof. (A) We irst show that, except for a countable set of
values �(�, �), we have �opt(�, �; �1) ≥ �opt(�, �; �2). Fix�, � and denote �� = ����(�, �; ��) for � = 1, 2. Suppose, by
contradiction, that �1 < �2; recall that, since �1 is optimal,
��1 − �1 (�1) > ��2 − �1 (�2) . (48)
hus
�1 (�2) − �1 (�1)�2 − �1 > �. (49)
Note that we wrote strict inequality in (48) because we
exclude the countable set of values �(�, �) where the max-
imum of ��,�(�) = ��−�1(�) is not unique. We do the same
for �2:
��2 − �2 (�2) > ��1 − �2 (�1) . (50)
hus
� > �2 (�2) − �2 (�1)�2 − �1 . (51)
Combining (49) and (51) we obtain
�1 (�2) − �1 (�1)�2 − �1 >
�2 (�2) − �2 (�1)�2 − �1 . (52)
his, however, contradicts (46) for � = �2 and � = �1.
hus, with the possible exception of a countable set of values�(�, �), we have �opt(�, �; �1) ≥ �opt(�, �; �2).
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he demand and supply of the agents are monotonic and
given for � = 1, 2 by the formulas
�(��, �) = 12� ∫
∞
0
(� − �)+�opt (�, �; ��) � (�) ��,
� (��, �) = 12� ∫
∞
0
(� − �)−�opt (�, �; ��) � (�) ��.
(53)
Let ���� be the market price for which supply equals
demand for the cost function ��; that is, �(��, ����) =�(��, ����).We further take���2 = min{� : �(�2, �) = �(�2, �)}
and ���1 = min{� : �(�1, �) = �(�1, �)}.
It has been proved that �opt(�, �; �1) ≥ �opt(�, �; �2).
hus, �(�1, �) ≥ �(�2, �) and �(�1, �) ≥ �(�2, �), ∀�. In
particular,�(�2, ���2) ≤ �(�1, ���2).
Let �1 be the solution of �(�1, �1) = �(�2, �1). Let us
prove that �1 ≥ ���2 . Suppose, on the contrary, that �1 < ���2 .
hen
�(�1, ���2) ≥ � (�2, ���2) = � (�2, ���2)
≥ � (�2, �1) = � (�1, �1) ≥ � (�1, ���2) ,
(54)
which means that all inequalities in (54) are in fact equalities,
in particular �(�2, ���2) = �(�2, �1) and�(�1, �1) = �(�2, ���2).
But we also have
�(�1, �1) ≥ � (�2, �1) ≥ � (�2, ���2) = � (�1, �1) (55)
which means again that all terms are equal, in particular
�(�2, �1) = �(�2, ���2). hus
�(�2, �1) = � (�2, ���2) = � (�2, ���2) = � (�2, �1) , (56)
whichmeans that�1 is a member of {� : �(�2, �) = �(�2, �)}.
However as ���2 is the minimum of such elements we arrive at
a contradiction. It follows that �1 ≥ ���2 .
Similarly we prove that �1 ≥ ���1 (see Figure 2). Hence it
holds that
TV�2 = � (�2, ���2) ≤ � (�2, �1) = � (�1, �1)
≤ � (�1, ���1) = TV�1 ,
(57)
which concludes the proof.
(B) We prove that (47) implies (46). Of course, it is
enough to consider � < �. Denote
� (�, �) = �2 (�) − �2 (�)� − � −
�1 (�) − �1 (�)� − � ,
∀�, � ≥ 0, � ̸= �.
(58)
Suppose that �0 and �0 > �0 exist such that � := �(�0,�0) < 0. Note that























Figure 2: Illustration of the proof of heorem 20.
hen, either�(�0, (�0+�0)/2) ≤ � < 0 or�((�0+�0)/2, �0) ≤� < 0. Iterating the argument we obtain two convergent
sequences �� and �� with lim�→+∞�� = lim�→+∞�� =
�∞, �� < ��, and �(��, ��) ≤ � < 0. Up to extracting
subsequences only three alternatives exist:
(1) �∞ ≤ �� < �� for all �,
(2) �� < �� ≤ �∞ for all �,
(3) �� ≤ �∞ ≤ �� for all �.
Alternative (3) can be reduced to (1) or (2) by noting that
since �(��, ��) = ((�� − �∞)/(�� − ��)) �(��, �∞) + ((�∞ −��)/(�� − ��))�(�∞, ��) then either �(��, �∞) ≤ � or�(�∞, ��) ≤ � < 0.
We only prove (1), the proof of (2) being completely
similar. When �∞ ≤ �� < �� we obtain
0 > � ≥ lim
�→+∞
� (��, ��) = ��2 (�+∞) − ��1 (�+∞) ≥ 0, (60)
which is a contradiction. hus (47) implies (46).
6. Concluding Remarks
hemain focus of this work is to establish the existence of an
equilibrium and its optimality in terms of trading volumes for
the model in Section 2.he results are proved under minimal
assumptions on the cost function and a relationship with the
convex hull of the cost function is proved. he model can be
used to investigate the determinants of the trading volume
andmay give hints on how to exit a situationwhen the volume
is abnormally low.
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